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COLERIDGE’S MALTA * 
 
In 1809 when Coleridge was prompted to write about his time in Malta by the death 
of Sir Alexander Ball, the late Civil Commissioner whom he so much admired,  he 
recorded that he regarded his stay on the Island as “in many respects the most 
memorable and instructive period of my life”.1    As those familiar with Coleridge’s 
history recall, Coleridge had arrived on  Malta in May  1804 predominantly to liberate 
himself from opium dependency.  
 
Coleridge impressed Ball, whom he met shortly after his arrival. Given the staffing 
problems confronting him, Ball eventually made Coleridge the offer of  Edmund 
Chapman’s post as under-secretary during the latter’s absence from Malta on the 
speculative corn mission, about which more will be ventured below.2  After an 
assurance that the work would be “nominal” Coleridge accepted the post because 
the salary would defray the expenses of his planned journey to Sicily.  
 
Coleridge thus began his official tasks as under-secretary to Ball. However, following 
the death of the Public Secretary and Treasurer, Alexander Macaulay, on 18th 
January 1805, Coleridge was appointed as a temporary replacement pending 
Chapman’s return to the Island, albeit that he declined to act as Treasurer.  As Acting 
Public Secretary he assumed a post second in civil dignity to that of the Civil 
Commissioner, and found himself at the heart of government.   
 
The purpose of this article is to outline the legal, political, administrative and 
economic challenges encountered by the British administration in the period 1800-
1809 in which Coleridge had assumed an important role, as well as to venture some 
comments about the coherence of British policy. Some limited observations on 
Coleridge’s contribution to the success of British rule at this time will also be 
advanced.    
                                                 
*This article is derived from Hough B., and Davis H., Coleridge’s Laws: a Study of Coleridge in 
Malta, (forthcoming). 
1  S. T. Coleridge, The Friend I (1818) Collected Works ed B. Rooke, Princeton, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1969,  p. 533. 
2 With the salary of the under-secretary during Chapman’s absence. To William Sotheby, Letters II 
1142. In this letter Coleridge mistakenly refers to himself as Ball’s private secretary.  
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 Preliminary remarks 
 
Between  1530 and the French invasion of Malta in 1798 the Island had been in the 
possession of the Knights Hospitaller of the Order of St John. The Knights were a lay 
and ecclesiastical élite, drawn from all the countries of Europe, who pursued a 
charitable and military mission on Malta. As a regional power they had provided a 
buttress against the westward Ottoman expansion. Within Malta the Knights pursued 
charitable and paternalist polices ostensibly for the benefit of the Maltese people.3  
Coleridge, of course, held a highly unfavourable view of the Order whom he regarded 
as degenerate-its members tainted by moral laxity and corruption.   
 
A complex administration had been developed under the Order. This was   
responsible for the funding and maintaining the defence of the Island, as well as 
other governmental activities such as maintaining a system of courts for the redress 
of disputes, minting the coinage, operating a police force, running hospitals, 
establishing and maintaining a water supply,4 operating customs duties and the bulk 
purchase and supply of grain and other foodstuffs by  means of the Università of 
Valletta, a municipal corporation upon which the British were to place a significant 
reliance.5  The Order also pursued welfare polices for the benefit of the Maltese, 
including welfare support for the poor and a system of medical care, which meant 
that health care was available to all. 
 
The costly policies and institutions fostered as part of the Order’s paternalist polices 
had been funded from revenue arising from various sources, including  customs 
duties, the profits the Order derived from commissioning privateers, rents from 
property on Malta owned by the Order and, above all, revenues from the Knights’ 
European estates. This latter source of revenue had been lost after the French 
                                                 
3 There had been little assimilation of the knights as rulers into Maltese society.  As a celibate order 
assimilation by marriage was obviously precluded. The Order  had also refused to share power with the 
Maltese and were perceived as despotic arrogant and elitist.) In this essence the Maltese had  a 
bifurcated society. The knights were, by 1798, widely seen as degenerate and immoral: see  Hardman, 
W A History of Malta during the Period of  French and British Occupation 1798-1815 (edited by J 
Holland Rose) London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1909,  Ch 1, and Coleridge, The Friend see n.1, p. 
536. 
4  Water was scarce. Aqueducts were used to pipe water into Valletta .  Parts of the system can still be 
seen. 
5 Pirotta, G. A., The Maltese Public Service 1800-1940 Msida: Mireva, 1996,  p.10, citing Ryan, F. W. 
The House of the Temple London: Burns and Oates,  1930, p. 103. 
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Convention abolished the Order in France and confiscated its assets in 1792.6 From 
the point of view of both the inhabitants and the Order the confiscation had been 
calamitous. It reduced the revenue of the Island by three–quarters.7 Its immediate 
effect for the economic and social system of the Order meant that the Island’s 
finances were plunged into a grave and  irredeemable deficit.8  
 
But this was not all because the system of providing subsidised grain had also run 
into deficit. The Order possessed a monopoly over the supply of grain. The purpose 
of the system was that the State controlled the price at which grain was retailed so as 
to ensure that plentiful  and affordable grain was available to the Maltese population. 
This was a particular advantage to the poor during times of regional shortage (eg 
1799-1806) when the international market price was high.   
 
This monopoly system was predicated on  achieving a long-term balanced budget. 
The price at which grain was sold might be above the purchase price, in which case 
the Università enjoyed a surplus for the year, or sold at less than cost price in which 
case the monopoly would be “trading” at a loss drawing on any surpluses that might 
have accrued in earlier years. The sales at a loss were, as we have seen, thought  to 
be necessary to shield the Maltese from inflation in the price of staple foodstuffs. 9  
But there was political capital to be gained as well, since price stability and ample 
staple food gained popularity for the autocratic regime of the Knights. 
 
The Grandmasters of the Order had, however, subsidised grain so heavily since 
about 1740 that the  Università  was insolvent before the French invasion.10 
Thornton, the careful and authoritative official who became Auditor-General in Malta 
                                                 
6 It has been estimated that the Knights spent in Malta circa £180,000 p.a. from their overseas 
revenues: see  Bartolo, P, British Colonial Budgeting in Malta: the first formative Decades 1800-1838  
Melita Historica 8 (1980) 1, at p. 7.   
7  See Hardman, above n.3 at   p. 548. The immediate loss of revenue as a result of the actions of the 
French Republic was about £50,000 per annum.  In 1788 the Island’s revenue was £136,417, but by 
1798 this was reported to have declined to a mere £34,663 14s 2d. See also the Report prepared by 
Captain Alexander Ball (as he then was) for Dundas  on 26th December 1800, Public Record Office, 
Kew CO 158/1/17-47, 20; Hardman, loc. cit. Appendix II. 
8  In 1796 this deficit was £34, 249, see Hardman loc. cit. p. 548. 
9 See Report by Ball to Dundas on Malta, 26th December 1800, above n. 7.   
10 See generally account of the Royal Commission of 1812, Public Record Office, Kew CO 
158/19/161-183, 167-169, and  the Report to His Excellency the Governor on the Accounts of the 
University of Valletta from 4th September 1800-31st December 1814” by W Thornton  dated 12th July 
1816  Public Record Office, Kew CO 163/33/1, 1816. 
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under the British, reported in 1816 that the deficit by the time of the French invasion 
was in excess of one million scudi (£100,000).11 
 
During the final days of the Order, local discontent at the failure of its welfare policies 
threatened political instability. The Order became desperate to secure the fragile 
foundation of its government by negotiating to place itself under the protection of 
Russia. The French, who disapproved of this development, had responded by 
invasion in 1798. 
 
The French occupation was soon disliked. Significantly the French had looted the 
capital of the Island, most notably the assets of the Island’s Treasury, the Public bank 
(the Università) and the Monte di Pietà (a publicly owned pawn broking and lending 
institution) as well as the assets of religious foundations. The consequences of this 
looting became especially significant when the British required funds for 
reconstruction.12   
 
The abuses perpetrated by the French  resulted in a popular uprising by the Maltese 
following Nelson’s defeat in August 1798 of the French navy at the Battle of Aboukir 
Bay.  British and other forces subsequently aided the Maltese in their liberation 
struggle. After  two years of siege and blockade the French garrison in Valletta 
surrendered to the British military. Much to their chagrin, the Maltese were excluded 
from the negotiations for the capitulation: Britain had resolved upon an exclusive right 
to control the affairs of the Island. The exclusion of the Maltese, and the failure to 
heed the representations that they might well have made, was to have lasting 
consequences. 
 
Alexander Ball, a naval officer under Nelson’s command, who  had been appointed 
as “Civil Governor” of the Island during the siege, was highly popular with the 
Maltese. They looked to him to continue a civil administration, which he did for a brief 
period after the surrender. Notwithstanding this he was ordered to return to his ship 
in February  1801. After a brief, unpopular, military government under Major-General 
Pigot, Charles Cameron was appointed the first British Civil Commissioner in May 
1801. However, Ball, who was asked to return to administer the Island and oversee 
                                                 
11 Thornton above n.10 and Bartolo, P, British Colonial Budgeting in Malta: the first formative 
Decades 1800-1838, above n. 6, who comments on the reliability of Thornton’s data. 
12 Eight thousand Maltese, few of whom returned,  citizens were sent by the French to fight in Egypt: 
Macaulay to Ball 25th January 1804, Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/10/119 
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the implementation of the Treaty of Amiens, took office to begin his second 
administration in July 1802.13 This lasted until his death in service in 1809. 
 
The Economy  
  
The Depression 1800-180514 
 
The blockade of the Island and the siege of the French in Valletta between 1798 and 
1800 had interrupted the efficient administration of the Island. Battle and other 
damage either  associated with the military operations or neglect included unrepaired 
and damaged highways, smashed buildings and other infrastructure. The 
reconstruction was a major problem that the new British administration had to 
address.   In addition to this the Island’s economy had collapsed resulting in high 
unemployment and circumstances of great want amongst the poorer Maltese. 
   
Valletta, wrote Ball, was as if taken by storm: many houses had either been 
destroyed or damaged; the shops had been plundered and emptied of stock, and the 
inhabitants “reduced to misery”;15   indeed  they were close to starvation.  Coleridge 
described how the ensuing economic depression was so severe that large numbers 
of the poor could only survive by begging on the streets. Many would congregate 
along a thoroughfare in Valletta that earned the name of the “Nix Mangiare Stairs”, 
named  after the cry of the supplicants who had nothing to eat.16 
  
The blockade had forced the occupying French forces to seize Maltese ships in the 
harbour and break them up for firewood, thus crippling the merchant capacity of the 
Island. This destruction also created a more pressing problem. The lack of grain in 
Valletta at the time of the surrender, combined with the lack of Maltese vessels in 
which to import supplies compelled Ball to rely on foreign owned vessels. As is well 
known, he granted passports to foreign owners on the grounds that these vessels 
would be crewed by Maltese and thus, in his opinion, would fall within the spirit of 
international law. Abusive practices grew up under which Maltese passports were 
sold or transferred to those not entitled to them. Ball’s controversial passport policy 
thus  caused some embarrassment to the British government. Coleridge was to issue 
                                                 
13  Public Record Office, Kew, CO 159/3/85. 
14 Evidence that the depression was over by April 1805 can be found at Ball to Camden, 19th April 
1805,  Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/10/ 131-2. 
15 Ball to Cooke, 21st July 1805,  Public Record Office, Kew  CO 158/10/181. 
16  The Friend 1818 above n. l,  p. 567. 
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an Avviso of 25th June 1805 cancelling all passports so as to nullify all those that had 
fallen into foreign hands. Henceforth passports would only be issued in accordance 
with international law and ministerial instructions. 
 
The cost of reconstruction would place considerable burdens on the public purse. 
But, as we shall see, the new administration faced the difficulty that the significant 
revenues that the Order had received from its overseas properties were no longer 
available. The income from exported cotton had also ceased and the old markets lost 
now that lost Spain was a hostile power. Significant numbers of the inhabitants were 
forced to rely on government hand-outs.17 The question was: would the British 
taxpayer inevitably assume the financial burden contrary to the wishes of British 
ministers?  
 
 
 British Policy on Malta 
   
Ball understood that if Britain were to retain Malta permanently, as he hoped it would, 
government policies had to ensure the support of the Maltese for British rule. Without 
the approval of the local population the island could not easily be maintained as a 
stable,  strategic  military base.18  It had impressed  him that the French had lost the 
Island following a popular insurrection, albeit not without critical help from British and 
other forces.  
 
Ball had also learned that the resentment and dissatisfaction of the Maltese with the 
Order had been exacerbated when the Order was no longer sufficiently resourced to 
continue its expensive welfare policies. Even before the French invasion the Maltese 
had began to conspire against the Order because it could not provide for them. No 
doubt Ball was fully aware of this and anxious to avoid a similar subversion of the 
British administration, which he hoped would be a permanent one.   
 
Ball’s long term policy, designed to win popularity with the inhabitants,  was to 
continue the operation of all the institutions of the government of the Order of St 
John.  He proposed to his political superiors in London that the constitutional, 
political, legal and administrative order of the ancien regime of the Order of St John 
                                                 
17  See e.g. the introduction to the Proclamation of 8th March 1805 explaining the context and reasons 
for  the introduction of the wine and spirits  tax.  
18  Pirotta, G. A,. above n.5, p.14.  
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should be continued. In his view, Britain should not seek to pursue reforms either in 
the administration or the Maltese constitution.19 In particular, the policies and 
institutions of the Order should be continued with only minor changes.  The rationale 
of this policy was to preserve the structure of Maltese political and economic life so 
as to avoid the Maltese being required to make a sudden adjustment to an unfamiliar   
legal, political, administrative or social structure.  
 
Accordingly, after the capitulation of the French garrison, Ball began to re-instate the 
political and legal institutions that existed under the Order. He believed that it was 
necessary to give the Maltese a material benefit from continued British possession of 
the Island, which meant not only re-establishing the legal and political order of the 
Order but also pursuing the policy of benign paternalism that characterised their 
administration. It was a policy of reassurance and  stability. 
 
The policy was also consonant with the possibility that the Island’s ultimate future 
would only be resolved once the war ended. Ministers naturally wished to avoid 
fundamental change in the institutions of government in case British possession 
proved to be one enjoyed merely for the duration of hostilities.    Ball’s continuation 
strategy was also consistent with lessons the British had learned from the somewhat 
difficult experiences in other colonies during the later part of the eighteenth century, 
as well as with general principles of the British constitution. Most significant was the 
principle that in ceded or conquered territories, such as Malta, the laws of the territory 
in question continue in force until altered by the Crown.20   Ball’s plan appeared to be 
a coherent, rational and constitutionally appropriate policy.  British ministers in 
Whitehall ratified it and established it as the guiding principle of government after 
1801.21 In fact the  Instructions  issued to Ball at the commencement of his second 
administration in 1802 went further than this: Ball was to secure the attachment of the 
                                                 
19  Ball wrote in 1807 that: “It has consequently been my uniform system to abstain from every kind of 
change except in case of absolute necessity.” In part this was so because when the British took 
possession of the Island  it was stipulated that the privileges of the Maltese be preserved and their 
ancient laws continued: see  Ball to Windham, 28th February 1807, Public Record Office, Kew CO 
158/13/45. 
20 Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204. 
21  As the Royal Instructions dated 14th May 1801  issued to Cameron, Ball’s successor at the close of 
the latter’s first administration, instructions of make clear. They are a vindication of Ball’s position. 
However, the political support for this plan  rests somewhat shakily on the information which Ball had 
supplied to London in his Report of 1800: Ball to Dundas, 26th December 1800, Public Record Office, 
above , n.7. 
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Maltese to British rule, which Ball interpreted as an injunction that  the Maltese 
benefit should from British government.22   
 
However, ministerial approval for Ball’s polices had been based upon a 
memorandum containing a statement of the finances of the Island, supplied by Ball to 
Dundas at the end of 1800.23  For reasons that are unclear, Ball made a hasty 
assessment that the revenues of the Island would meet the expenses of civil 
government. This meant, of course, that there would be no burden on the British 
taxpayer and made the possibility of retaining the Island as a British possession ( a 
policy to which was firmly committed) much more attractive to policy makers in 
London.   
 
Ball’s statement hardened into a political expectation: the civil government was 
required to ensure that that Island’s finances were not in deficit. 24 
 
 
One of the obvious difficulties that Ball ought to have understood was that, in 
adopting the continuation strategy, the British were assuming substantial financial 
and political burdens, not least for the hospitals, the payment of alms, the Università 
and the expense  of the  reconstruction of the Island’s battle damaged or otherwise 
neglected infrastructure.  Above all, the Administration had to bear the cost of  
maintaining the grain subsidy. Maltese expectations had been raised that their old 
way of life would continue, and this was an expectation that it would be dangerous to 
frustrate. Ball had, it seems, unwittingly manoeuvred himself into incommensurate 
political obligations: on the one had he had to satisfy ministers by balancing the 
budget; on the other, he had encouraged  high expectations amongst the Maltese, 
and might risk insurrection if he could not deliver. The pressing question was how the 
continuation polices of government were to be funded, given the loss of much of the 
Island’s revenue after 1792.   
 
A further political risk for Ball lay within the structure of government itself. The 
absence of a popular representative assembly  under the Order of St John, a policy 
                                                 
22  Public Record Office, Kew, FO 49/3/51-60. 
23  Ibid. 
24 The assumption that this was possible derives from Ball’s Report to Dundas of December 1800, 
above n.7. This translated into a political expectation as Hobart’s Instructions to Cameron dated 14th 
May 1801 make clear: see Hardman above n. 3 at p. 355.  Ball, whose reputation was clearly at issue, 
was eager to assure ministers  that a balanced budget could be achieved: see e.g.  Public Record Office, 
Kew, CO 158/10/ 125. 
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which the British would not reverse,  meant that the burden of securing the 
compliance of the Maltese inhabitants rested entirely on the administration. In 
continuing this system the British  had assumed an exclusive responsibility to deliver. 
There would be no possibility that the Civil Commissioner might escape blame for 
any failure of policy  by using an inept local assembly as a convenient scapegoat.   
 
Thus important questions arise from Ball’s political agenda. The principal of these 
goes to competence.    Did the continuity strategy, and by extension the financial 
strategy, in its conception and in its execution conform to standards of good 
government? 
 
 
 In what follows it will be argued that notwithstanding its superficial merit of assured 
stability the continuation policy was fractured by structural weaknesses both in its 
conception and implementation. Many of these difficulties  derived from an 
inappropriate and poorly managed staffing policy, the rather elusive and problematic 
state of Island’s finances, as well as from ill-advised or poorly executed 
implementation strategies. Financial and administrative accountability from the 
departments of government either to the Civil Commissioner  or the Public Secretary 
appears, for example, to have been problematic. Important archive material, which 
reveals something of the expected role of the Public Secretary, also suggests  the 
limited extent to which Coleridge fulfilled that expectation. This not only reveals 
something of Coleridge’s success as an administrator, but it also exposes an 
important lacuna that lay within the heart of government in 1805.   
 
 
Ball’s Staffing Policy 
 
The talent, qualifications, neutrality, expertise and dedication of civil service staff are 
pre-eminent characteristics of a professional and efficient administration.  Ball’s 
staffing policy was based on considerations other than these qualities. This policy 
introduced a structural weakness into government that was to have long term 
consequences. This was particularly problematic given Balls willingness to devolve 
responsibility to administrators. The failure to operate appropriate systems of 
financial accountability only made matters worse. 
 
 9
Ball notoriously used public appointment for political ends, most importantly to signal 
to the Maltese that there were important benefits to be gained from loyalty to the 
British. For example, he rewarded Vincenzo Borg, the former leader of the Birkikara 
battalion during the uprising as a member of the Board of Administrators of Public 
Property.25 Once Borg became allied with Ball’s political opponents, he was 
dismissed. Ball  later  claimed that Borg was almost illiterate.26  If this was so, it begs 
the question why he was considered to be fit for office in the first place?   
 
Similar questions arise about other appointments. For example, the Marchese di 
Testaferrata was rewarded with an appointment as a Jurat, (one of the four directors 
of the Università) only to be removed to the less-demanding role of the Presidency of 
the Monte di Pietà when his ‘weak intellect’ and ‘advanced age’ were found to limit 
his efficiency. 27 As Testaferrata was implacably opposed to Ball’s refusal to set up a 
Consiglio Popolare, or representative assembly with legislative powers, there is a 
suspicion that his disloyalty may have been the real reason his removal from office. 
 
A responsibility for establishing and monitoring standards of good government or 
good public administration which public law requires fell squarely on the shoulders of 
the Public Secretary.28 The importance of discharging this responsibility  was 
enhanced by Ball’s policy, since it became incumbent to supervise untrained 
incompetent, and possibly self-interested staff.  Central to the exercise of this 
responsibility  would have been the authorising of expenditure and the auditing of the 
accounts  first to ensure that spending was within the budgetary constraints and  
secondly applied only to the purposes legitimated by government policy and 
approved by senior officials.  Auditing the departments was intended to ensure that 
spending was efficient, economic and effective. 29 
 
                                                 
25 He was also appointed as a ‘Luogotenente’ (Mayor)  of Birkarkara,(sic) his casal or village, Ball to 
Windham, Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/13/16 et seq, 28th February 1807. 
26 Ball to Windham,  above n.19  
27 Ball to Windham,  above n.19. Documents in the National Library of Malta, NLM Univ 827/5, 
suggests that he was removed at the close of 1804. 
28  A list and description of the institutions falling within the responsibility of the  Public Secretary’s 
Office can be found at Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/13/ 466, 469-7. A list of the Office holders 
and description of the duties of the Office of Public Secretary can be found in the Catalogue of Records 
of the Public Secretary and Treasurer 1800-1813, Joseph A Caruana, National Malta Archives, 
Introduction. 
29 Coleridge records that he was engaged in auditing: Coleridge Note Book , The Notebooks of Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge, Coburn K (ed) vol 2 1804-1808,  Bollingen Series 2552 17.110 
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Lax accounting practices, corruption, poor financial information and the competence 
of officials can all be   identified at the time Coleridge was Acting Public Secretary 
and this evidence raises questions about how effective he was in his role. 
 
One of the most serious issues was corruption and its causes. At least one possible 
reason for this- which Eton had identified in 180130, was that wage levels were too 
low.  Junior civil servants in particular were not well paid.  Maitland was to observe 
that there wages were so low that it was impossible for the employees to live off them 
without indulging in dishonest and corrupt practices. The inadequate remuneration 
was only addressed in 1814,31 so pay grievances were probably rife when Coleridge 
held office.       
 
We  know that Coleridge had some knowledge of corrupt practices on the Island. He 
had investigated a suspected  case of it in  the dockyard;32 and after he left the 
Island he retained an affidavit sworn to him in his official  capacity by a dockyard 
official.33 But this instance was probably just one amongst many because corruption 
extended even to the senior civil servants. By 1807 Ball had disclosed that Naudi, 
who had held office as a Jurat, had been dismissed from office for corruption. It was 
perhaps of some comfort that incriminating information about him had been sent to 
the Public Secretary by his fellow Jurats.34    
 
We know that the Royal Commission, in 1812, had identified serious failings, 
including corrupt practices35. These fell to Maitland to rectify in his administrative 
reforms of 1814.36 Although he singled out the  Università and department of public 
property as particular examples of this problem, 37 he seems to have thought that  it 
extended more widely tainting the work of  the government departments as well as 
                                                 
30  Eton to Sullivan 29th July 1801 Public Record Office, Kew,  CO 158/2/318. 
31 Maitland to Bathurst 24 October 1814, on measures taken to ensure “a permanent and settled mode 
of administering the expenditure of the public money in the various department of this Island”, Public 
Record Office, Kew, CO 158/25/209, who records government encouraged, prior to 1814, expectation 
of high salaries. 
32 Sultana, D. Samuel Taylor Coleridge in Malta and Italy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969,  p 353 
33 Victoria University, Toronto Library. F.14.8b: see also  Coburn, K., The Notebooks of Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge 1957-1974, Appendix B of 1804-1808. 
34  Ball to Windham 28th February 1807, CO 158/13/ 16 et seq. 
35 Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/19/6-88; for example, that delaying appeals was a consequence 
of “corruption or caprice” p 13. See also Pirotta, above, n.5, p 82. 
36 Maitland alludes to the problem of low-pay creating conditions under which corruption would be 
rife-where “government can neither be honestly nor economically served””: Maitland to Bathurst, 24th 
October 1814, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/25/209, 210. The solution was large pay rises:  
Maitland  increased the wages of public servants, including the judges who received very large 
increases (Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/25/215, 284-285. 
37   Maitland to Bathurst, 13th October 1814,  Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/25/169 
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the charitable institutions.38 Maitland, also identified, two distinct problems. There 
was a failure to collect and bring in all public revenue, thereby indicating 
administrative laxity which enabled significant sums  remained in private hands.39  A 
second issue was that revenue actually collected went unaccounted for in the 
department administering public property and the Università. A reasonable inference, 
which British opinion seemed to take, was that low pay may have tempted certain 
underpaid Maltese officials to divert funds from the public purse. They seem to have 
held the view (not unreasonably given the terms of the Definitive Treaty of Amiens of 
1802 which, if implemented, would have returned the Island to the Order of St John) 
that the British possession would be short-lived.  Before the British administration 
came to end, it was perhaps felt that there were profitable opportunities to be seized; 
and they diverted money, with a misplaced sense of patriotism before the opportunity 
for profit was lost.40   
 
The low-pay of Maltese government employees was certainly a problem that Ball 
recognised. Coleridge’s Bando of 8th March 1805 imposed excise duties on alcohol 
expressly makes clear that one of its purposes was to raise funds to increase the 
salaries of deserving public servants. It seems, however, that the steps taken must 
have been insufficient to fully address the problem of encouraging faithful service.  
Since effective remedial action was delayed until 1814 it poses the question whether 
Ball kept the matter sufficiently under review?  As in other matters, such as the 
reform of the hospitals, which is considered below, the impression created is that 
having  intervened once Ball’s attention moved away. There seems to have been 
little or no enthusiasm either for monitoring the effectiveness of a measure or its 
implementation.  
 
 
Devolved Responsibility – Management Systems 
 
The most obvious corollary of the staffing policy was that the inexperienced and 
disengaged officials would have to be closely supervised.  There is evidence the 
systemic failure in this regard went to the competence and effectiveness of Ball’s 
administration.  
                                                 
38 Id. 
39  Maitland to Bathurst 24th October 1814, see above n. 31, CO 158/25/209, et seq. See also Bartolo, P, 
above n.6, p. 2.  
40  Coleridge also recorded the widely held suspicion that the British would deliver up Malta to the 
enemies of its people whenever it suited the Crown to do so see The Friend,   above n.1 at p. 564. 
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 The administrative system suffered from a poor articulation of where responsibility for 
attaining policy objectives lay.  The Civil Commissioner and Public Secretary’s 
supervisory power over expenditure was further weakened because their prior written 
authority for expenditure was not required. It seems that money could be spent or 
work commenced without obtaining prior formal authority: instructions by word of 
mouth was all that was required.41 This laxity in financial control meant that the case 
for public expenditure was not properly scrutinised. Informal, verbal authority for 
expenditure also undermined the accounting system for systematic record keeping 
was not taking place. Ball’s direction to the Jurats in 1803 (see further below) , giving 
them a free hand to run the Università, also  signalled that adherence to the formal 
processes were not desired so long as stated goals were attained. The problem in 
this instance was, that the overriding goal of providing the necessary surplus for the 
benefit of the Island was not even stated as a goal. 
 
 
The Importance of the Università  
 
Since his first administration Ball seems to have decided the continuation strategy 
was sustainable if the grain monopoly produced a surplus. From as early as late 
1800 he appears to have believed that the grain monopoly exercised through the 
Università could achieve a surplus. He had erroneously convinced Lord Hobart  that 
this had been so in the final years of the Order of St John.42  This deeply rooted 
misconception, which might have been further fuelled by a report from Macaulay to 
Cameron in July 1802 that the Università had achieved a surplus of £50,000 
(500,000 scudi), 43 placed the continuation strategy in jeopardy unless the British 
taxpayer would shoulder the burden.  
 
The supposed opportunity for profit presented by the Università was central to Ball’s 
financial planning. Accordingly,  we should expect Ball  and his Public Secretary to 
supervise and monitor the Università’s operations.  It was, after all, a bulwark policy 
on which the funding of the public and charitable institutions largely depended and 
                                                 
41 Maitland to Bathurst October 24th 1814, see above n. 31, Public Record Office, Kew, CO158/25/209-
224, 218. 
42  Ball to Dundas Public Record Office, Kew, December 1800 CO 158/1/3 and see Hobart’s 
instructions to Cameron, Ball’s successor, dated 14th May 1801, Hardman, above n.3, p.354. 
43 CO 158/3/88-89. 
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with it the social and economic prosperity of the Maltese. The obligation to supervise 
it was made explicit in the Royal Instructions to Cameron in May 1801. 
 
Under the Order of St John, the Università had been required to submit monthly 
accounts to the Grandmaster who had, in effect, exercised  complete control over the 
Jurats (directors).   Ball and Coleridge might thus have been expected to take at least 
as close an interest in how the Università was run as the Grandmasters had done. It 
ought also have been an axiom of Ball’s strategy to understand  what progress it was 
making in generating the required revenue.  
 
The surplus from the Università was paid into the Public Treasury and ought to have 
been the subject of reports to the Civil Commissioner. Financial and other reporting 
would be a key component of this monitoring. Of course, Coleridge did not accept the 
post of Treasurer, so this represents an important vacuum within the administrative 
structures. The first question, is whether a suitable set of mechanisms, or a suitable 
process of scrutiny and accountability has been created and maintained in relation to 
this key institution? Further, were the rules for its operation clearly and coherently 
articulated? 
 
As we have described, the Jurats had an operational responsibility for the running of 
the Università, but this was overseen by the Public Secretary. Although he had 
declined to act as Treasurer he  could not side-step the supervision of the Università 
the accounts of which the Public Secretary was obliged to audit    This would have 
engaged him in assessing the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of spending 
within the Università.   The guiding purposes of the audit would have been to ensure 
proper  supervision of  the Jurats, and to ensure financial probity, rigour and 
efficiency.  Coleridge thus found himself with a burdensome responsibility going to 
the heart of government polices.  
  
Financial Accountability of the Università 
  
There  is incontrovertible evidence that Ball determined, for reasons now unclear,  to 
keep the Università’s work at arm’s length.  He expressly forbad the Jurats to involve 
him in approving operational matters, and there is strong evidence that the 
supervision of the operational management of the Università was, at best, very light 
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touch.   By a letter signed by Mr Macaulay in 180344 Ball admonished the Jurats for 
their previous practice of referring a great many operational decisions to him for his 
approval. He instead directed them to use their initiative to realise the broad policy 
goals (principally the provision of cheap, abundant food). The importance of 
generating a surplus was not mentioned.   
 
This might have been less damaging if Ball had directed them to report to the Public 
Secretary’s office rather than to him, but the instructions did not do so. The clear 
implication is that the Jurats were to have considerable autonomy and that they need 
not report either to the Civil Commissioner or the Public Secretary.  This letter, as 
Thornton observed in 1816,   gave the Jurats authority for everything that could be 
done in their department.45   
 
The structural failing in accountability that resulted from the letter is easily 
understood.  It reveals a failure to articulate clear and coherent rules under which the 
Jurats should operate, as well as weaknesses in the chain of reporting and of 
supervision. The Jurats were given carte blanche to fix the purchase price (relative to 
the quality of the product), and to buy as much or as little as they chose, but 
government was permitted to set the retail price. The problem was, of course,  that 
this price was necessarily capped by what the labouring poor could have afforded to 
pay. Therein lay the potential difficulty.  If the retail price could not be significantly 
raised, the Jurats ought to have come under pressure to acquire grain at lower 
prices- in other words bargain harder- or to purchase more cheaply elsewhere. The 
international shortage of grain meant that either course would have been difficult for 
them. But Macaulay’s letter reveals that Ball did not intervene to direct the Jurats as 
to the amount that they should pay for grain in order to achieve the desired surplus. 
Nor did he make explicit in this letter the wider  policy goals relating to the surplus 
that they should have pursued.  
 
There is thus the inexplicable possibility  that the Jurats were left to manage their 
affairs without the close involvement of the Civil Commissioner (or the Public 
                                                 
44 Macaulay to the Jurats, 9th August 1803 is contained in an appendix to  Report to His Excellency the 
Governor on the Accounts of the University of Valletta from 4th September 1800-31st December 1814” 
by W Thornton  dated 12th July 1816  Public Record Office, Kew CO 163/33/1, 1816. 
45 Thornton id.  CO 163/33/9. 
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Secretary).  Maitland even made the  alarming suggestion that the Università’s 
accounts might not have been externally audited.46  
 
However,  this is not to say that that there were no checks on the Jurats. The monthly 
accounts were audited and signed off as “approved and verified” by senior Maltese 
officials in the Università.47 This was, however, only an internal audit. If so was Ball 
content to rely on  internal scrutiny?  Was there any further financial control imposed 
by the Public Secretary’s office under Coleridge?   
 
Financial reporting by the Jurats to the Civil Commissioner, in so far as it took place 
revealed significant problems for the British administrators. The first of these was that 
Ball was made aware as early as January 1804 that the accounting system  had not 
met appropriate public law standards.48 Although Macaulay insisted that practice had 
been rectified, his reassurance contained a caveat. This emphatically revealed that 
routine scrutiny by British officials, notably the Public Secretary,  was not taking 
place. Macaulay wrote: “..an inspection of [the Università’s] accounts convinced a 
man who had seen them that they were exact.”49 By this own admission, Macaulay 
had clearly not seen the accounts himself; and it can only speculated as to who “the 
man who had seen them” might have been.  
 
This lax arrangement meant that the responsibility for the audit and inspection of the 
accounts had been delegated. Moreover, the Public Secretary had not seen and 
verified them.  It may have been for that reason that Ball seems not to have included 
them in the Island’s accounts of 1804-5. However, Camden requested the 
Università’s accounts in a despatch of 23rd May 1804 when the funding by the British 
Treasury of the corn buying mission was being considered.50 Ball, in a reply dated 
August 4th,  that was written in Coleridge’s hand, assured Camden that he had 
requested the Università’s accounts to be made up for the latest period.51 It was 
these that Macaulay delivered on 10th September 1804.  In other words, the detailed 
and more professional report may only have been prepared in response to a 
                                                 
46 This possibility was suggested by Maitland: see Maitland to Bathurst 13th October 1814, Public 
Record Office Kew,  CO158/25/169, 171. 
47  See NLM LBR 827/5. Monthly accounts at this time (1804-5) were approved either by  a former 
Jurat, one Baron Savero Gauci, acting alone or, in some months,  with the additional signature of the  
Commissario di Sanità, Dr Azupardi  
48  Macaulay to Ball, 25th January 1804, Public Record Office, Kew,  CO  158/8/111. 
49  Id. 
50 Camden to Ball , 23rd May 1804 Public Record Office, Kew CO 159/3/122. 
51 Ball to Camden , 4th August 1804, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/9/42-3. 
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ministerial demand arising from the “final” investment that the British Government 
was prepared to make in the Università.52  
 
However, although Ball and Macaulay must have been satisfied with them, it still 
appears that they were  inaccurate, and that this fact eluded these British officials.  
Mr Macaulay stated that the Università had yielded a net profit excess of £13,000 for 
that financial year.53 Thornton subsequently re-calculated this at around £4250. This 
divergence is significant. 
 
 
The impression is ever present that close financial scrutiny was lacking.  In  February 
1805 Ball  claimed that since he had had control of the corn monopoly he had 
delivered a surplus of  between fifteen to twenty thousand pounds on it even though 
wheat had been supplied at cheaper rates than in  either Sicily  or Italy.54  This was 
stated as a historical fact; it was not a forecast of what he expected from the Black 
Sea corn mission. This impression of indeterminacy (was it fifteen thousand pounds,  
twenty thousand pounds or some other sum? If so what? ) suggests that in early 
1805 he was either unable or unwilling to state with correctness the sum he claimed   
the surplus to be. Here too, it is possible to identify the problems caused by the 
absence of a Treasurer and, presumably, a lack of (reliable) information from the 
Jurats.     
   
A different but nonetheless vexing  problem can be identified in Ball’s statement of 
accounts for the Island 1805-1806. Here, whilst admitting to the loss of the expected 
revenue from the corn mission,  Ball reported that the  Università made a profit in that 
financial year in excess of £12,033.55 The precision of the sum stated does suggest 
that, on this occasion,  Ball had received apparently  carefully computed  information 
                                                 
52 The capital required having been supplied by the Treasury in London, Camden wanted assurances 
that no further demands would be made on British funds. The submission of the Università’s accounts 
was intended to give that assurance. 
53  Macaulay to Ball 10th September 1804, £13,005 19s 10d. CO 158/9/60. He further  reported that the  
Università held almost £110, 000 in cash in their treasury, corn and oil. After deducting expenses it 
owed  a sum £81 655 to Government. 
54  See Ball to Cooke, 3rd February 1805 Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/10/23. He still expressed 
the belief that the Order of St John had, in its final two decades, made an annual surplus of £10,000 on 
the grain monopoly.   Coleridge repeated in The Friend above n.1 at p 570 that bread was supplied 
more cheaply on average than in Italy or the coast  of Barbary. 
55 Ball to Shee 12th May 1807, Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/13/319-320. The Island’s 
expenditure nevertheless resulted in a deficit in excess of £17,000 in the period 25th July 1805-24th July 
1806 (which was greater than the deficit of £11,216 incurred in the previous financial year, 1804-1805: 
CO 158/11 (no folio number) Ball to E Cooke 1st March 1806). 
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from the Jurats. However, in this, as in other instances the reported figures also 
seem to be highly misleading. Thornton recorded a loss (1805-6) in excess of eight 
hundred thousand scudi (£80,000 approx.).  These inaccuracies were routine. For 
example, one of the four Jurats, Charles Livingstone,  reported in 1807 that during 
the previous four years the corn monopoly had achieved a surplus of almost 500,000 
scudi (£50,000),56 and Ball reported to London that the Università’s average annual 
surplus was about £12,000.57  Thornton’s accounts suggest a loss for these financial 
years  in excess of one million scudi (£100,000).  
 
In a devastating admission, Ball eventually conceded that the  scrutiny of accounts 
was not taking place. He requested the appointment of an auditor and comptroller- 
general because the workload involved in supervising the government departments  
was too great either for him (or the Public Secretary) to bear. He continued:  “(t)he 
superintendence, indeed, of the public departments more immediately devolves on 
the joint office of the Public Secretary and Treasurer; but the various duties attached 
that situation must necessarily prevent the investigation of accounts which requires 
exclusive and undivided attention.” 58 (Emphasis supplied)  
 
This is a powerful indictment of Ball’s judgment for two reasons. Firstly this so 
because, by his own admission, a centrally important function of government was not 
being performed with the result that  senor officials including the Civil Commissioner 
himself had little idea of whether appropriate public law standards of government 
were being observed.   Second, Ball’s judgment is directly impugned if the combined 
offices resulted in a workload so onerous that it could not properly be discharged. 
This is so because the proposal that one officeholder perform both functions was 
advanced by him and accepted by Government on his recommendation.59 
 
This systemic weakness must  explain why the financial information upon which Ball 
relied was misleading and unreliable.  Ball’s administration lacked an effective  
system of independent scrutiny. This conclusion finds some support in the Royal 
Commission’s Report in 1812.  
                                                 
56  Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/13/207..  In 1801 the rate of exchange was 10 scudi to the 
pound sterling. See Ball’s memorandum to Dundas, 26th December 1800. 
57  Ball to Windham Public Record Office, Kew, 28th February 1807, CO 158/13/77. 
58 Ball to Cooke, 30th November 1807,  Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/13/465, and also Ball to 
Shee 12th May 1807,  ,  Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/13/463, CO 158/13/ 315-6. 
59 Sullivan to Ball 31st December 1803- National Library of Malta Libr 531 f 18 notifying Ball that 
Ball’s suggestion that the offices of Public Secretary and Treasurer be combined was accepted and that 
Macaulay’s salary be increased  accordingly to £1000 per annum. 
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 In respect of the Università the Commissioners reported that they found a “probable” 
large accumulation of debt by the Università.60 The tentative statement that the debt 
was “probable” was a devastating indictment of the deplorable state of the  
Università’s accounts, rather than any optimism that the books had ever actually 
balanced.61 This failure had not been rectified either by Coleridge or Ball. However 
there is little doubt that Ball was aware of it since Macaulay had reported inconsistent 
accounting practices to him in 1804.62   
 
The examples of negligence that Thornton was later to describe cannot have been 
difficult to overlook if inspections had taken place.  For example,  the books were left 
unclosed when they did not balance; there were “false entries” in the ledger made to 
give the appearance that the books balanced. 63 The entries were “chaotic” with the 
result that, when expert audit was finally attempted, it was not possible even for a 
skilled auditor to furnish fully accurate financial information.64  Why was this not 
discovered and rectified much earlier than 1812? 
 
Surviving records also suggest that Coleridge does not appear to have fulfilled all of 
the many responsibilities of the Public Secretary’s role, and one important lacuna 
created by this appears to have concerned the Università.    Correspondence from 
the Jurats to Macaulay (Coleridge’s predecessor in office) is a notable feature of the  
surviving archives, albeit that some letters were addressed to  the “Maltese 
Secretary” , Giuseppe Zammit, and others to Ball himself.65 But after Macaulay’s 
death, when Coleridge took over,  letters from the Jurats  were not addressed to him. 
Instead the Jurats communicated directly with either Ball or Zammit. Once Chapman, 
a professional administrator, had assumed the Public Secretary’s role following his 
return from the Black Sea, the Jurats communicated with him as well as with 
Zammit.66   
 
                                                 
60  Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/19/172-173, 182. 
61  Thornton 1816 above n.10 at CO 163/33/9. 
62  Above n. 48. 
63  Thornton above n.10., Public Record Office, Kew CO 163/33/9-10. 
64 Thornton id. 
65 See National Library of Malta, Uni 425: letters from the Jurats to Macaulay in 1804 are dated 27th 
June, 10th July, 4th September and 26th October.  
66 E.g.,  National Library of Malta  Univ 425,  16th May 1806. 
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Ball was adamant that he was too pressed to devote close attention to the work of 
the Università67 and had expressly objected to doing so. The likely conclusion, given 
Coleridge’s apparent lack of engagement with this institution, may be that the 
supervision was largely delegated because  Coleridge was not receiving reports from 
the Università and there is a complete  absence of “ordine” (written instructions) 
issued in his name. 68 This reveals that he was not directing either its operations nor, 
indeed, those of other government institutions. This work also seems largely to have 
been delegated to Zammit. Coleridge’s lack of engagement and Ball’s decision to 
distance himself from close supervision of the Università’s work suggests that the 
Jurats were not held accountable by the most senior officeholders. This may explain 
why it was ran up huge deficits  whilst allowing British officials to believe the contrary. 
 
   
Ball’s Financial Strategy 
 
Ball’s financial strategy involved three fundamental elements: (i) taxation; (ii) 
efficiency savings; and (iii) the generation of revenue for the purposes of civil 
government. 
 
(i) Taxation 
 
Cameron’s proclamation of 15th July 1801, his first to the Maltese people, promised 
to uphold the laws and to respect the ‘dearest rights’ of the Maltese, their churches, 
holy religion, persons and property.69 This proclamation caused  confusion as to 
whether it had  unwittingly created for the Maltese a constitutional right in relation to 
taxation, namely a commitment not to impose new taxes.  
 
To aggravate matters, Ball had also discovered that every Grandmaster, at the time 
of his election, had been required to swear an oath not to levy new taxes, and this 
commitment had binding constitutional status.70 The unforeseen possibility was that 
(at the very least) the Proclamation of 15th July 1801 had inadvertently raised 
expectations that new taxes would not be imposed or worse still, had created a 
                                                 
67 This reluctance to engage in, what he described as  the detail of administration, extended to all 
departments of government, including the inspection of accounts: see Ball to Cooke 30th November 
1807 CO 158/13/463. 
68 See  National Archive Malta  LIBR A22 PS01/2. 
69 Hardman, above n.3 at p. 358. This  constitutionally important Proclamation addressed to the 
Maltese Nation (“Alla Nazione Maltese”). 
70  Ball to Camden, 19th April 1804, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/10/ 128, 130-131. 
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constitutional limitation on the power to tax.71 Given the loss of the overseas revenue 
of the Knights,  the social and economic condition of the Island, and the failure of the 
Università to generate the required surplus, this was a matter of real concern.  
 
Ball at first attempted to  avoid the unpopularity and politically dangerous expedient 
of imposing new taxation. By 1805 he was forced into a volte face. By this time it was 
evident that the Island’s financial deficit could not be addressed by other means. 
Moreover, there was a further expensive political issue that he had to address.   A 
major grievance nurtured by the Maltese arose from their exclusion from the 
negotiations for the French surrender. They understood that the French had offered 
hostages as a security to ensure that the sums taken from the Università and 
elsewhere would be re-imbursed, but the British, for reasons which remain obscure, 
failed to make any provision for this restitution in the surrender articles.  
 
This regrettable omission resulted in financial misery for a number of Maltese who 
lived off the interest paid on the capital once deposited in the Bank of the Università  
and for whom the economic bedrock of their lives had been destroyed. Those 
Maltese who suffered significant hardship naturally blamed the British administration 
for the negligence of the. British military. Ball had received petitions requesting him to 
take steps to deal equitably with the affected individuals who had placed their capital 
in the Università. He eventually had little choice but to alleviate their distress; and it 
was in the Proclamation of 8th March, 1805, that Ball ultimately had to respond to the 
justice of their financial demands.  Funds would have to be raised so as to allow Ball 
to make (capped) interest payments to those affected. 72 Coleridge, as Public 
Secretary, drafted the bando imposing the duty on wines and spirits that 
implemented this new policy. Not the least of its most interesting characteristics is 
that it goes considerable lengths to win the argument that the tax was necessary and 
desirable. Within the very instrument that makes the new law, Coleridge was forced 
to make a political and moral case justifying its introduction.   
 
Notwithstanding that the taxes were presented to the Maltese as addressing the 
plight of deserving individuals, (whilst being presented to London as addressing 
                                                 
71 Discussed by the Royal Commission in 1812: Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/19/151-154. 
72  Ball also reduced the Bank’s liability in other respects. On 20th March 1805 the interest on the loans 
made under the Public Notice of 7th March 1804 were declared to have ceased and the capital deposited 
held at the disposal of the lenders until withdrawn. It seems that not all deposits were withdrawn and so 
a large sum of about 400, 000 scudi (£40,000) remained in the University without paying interest on it. 
This sum  remained unpaid to the depositors until 1809. See Thornton  above n. 10 at p. 26 
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economic fundamentals73) it is evident that Ball expected the new duties to raise 
additional funds to defray other expenses of civil government.74  The readiness to 
use taxation to supplement the Island’s revenue may disclose less than complete  
confidence in the Università’s ability to generate sufficient revenue. 
 
(ii) Income generation 
 
It was clear that a deficit (however large) could not be removed without the radical 
intervention of government.  By 1805, when Ball had realised that he could not avoid 
the imposition of some new taxation, he nevertheless continued to assert that the 
grain monopoly operated by the Università could provide the major source of the 
Island’s revenue.   When this surplus was combined with revenues from the new 
taxes he thought his twin-tracked strategy would eliminate the deficit.75 He even went 
so far as to re-state the assessment he had made in his influential memorandum to 
Dundas of December 26th 1800 that the Islands finances would be brought into 
balance.76  
 
Ball badly needed to produce a profit on the grain monopoly to defray the expenses 
of the institutions and policies of government.  He therefore proposed a speculative 
mission to buy corn from the Black Sea region. Edmund Chapman was dispatched 
on this task and for this reason was not available to succeed Macaulay on the latter’s 
death in 1805. This was the reason why Coleridge held the post as Acting Public 
Secretary pending Chapman’s return. 
 
 
 
The corn mission of 1804-5   
 
                                                 
73 Ball to Camden, 19th April 1805, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/10/ 132. 
74  Ball to Camden, 19th April 1805, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/10/132-3 reveals that only 
30% of the net revenue raised would be applied to the relief of those having claims on the Università. 
The duties in question were  the revival of the old scisa della bene publiche; the duty on wines and 
spirits; and a duty on public auctions. Ball estimated that the wine tax would bring in an annual  surplus 
of £6,000 and the other duties a further £4,000. Thus when added to the surplus on the Università, in 
April 1805,  he expected to increase revenue by £30,000 per annum 
75  See Ball to Camden 19th April, 1805 Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/10/ 125.  He estimated hat 
£30,000 would be generated by the monopoly and the taxes. 
76 Id at 128. 
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Ball predicted a clear profit of £20,000 on the corn venture, which he appears to have 
regarded as one of low-risk carrying a high probability of vindicating his forecasts.77   
He was confident that this would succeed and that “in a short time” the income to the 
Treasury would cover the civil expenditure. 78   
The speculation in corn was critical to Ball’s long term financial planning.  His 
predictions on the sum that would be realised had also hardened into a firm political 
expectation for which, as the Secretary of State made clear, Ball would be 
accountable. No further funds to support the Università would be forthcoming from 
the British Treasury; the venture was politically required to succeed in the manner 
that Ball had unwisely predicted that it would.79   
 
The significant quantity of wheat required to be purchased  and transported to meet 
the objectives of the scheme involved evident risks,  but the venture was judged to 
be worthwhile because, when compared with the imposition of what would otherwise 
be highly burdensome taxes,  this speculative opportunity represented a less 
antagonistic means of replacing the lost revenues of the Order and continuing the 
political agenda to which Ball was firmly attached .80   
 
However, the corn mission was poorly executed: the maladministration of officials 
meant that instead of the healthy surplus, the administration incurred further losses, 
which aggravated the Island’s financial position. It also caused grave political 
embarrassment since questions of judgment and competence were inevitably posed.  
Ball was forced by his political opponents to become defensive about his policies.81 
 
                                                 
77  See Ball to Camden Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/9/47 16th September 1804 in which he sent 
the accounts of 1803-4.    He subsequently went so far as to state that the needs of the Island for its 
‘immediate defence’ could then also be met from its revenues. He contemplated a permanent garrison 
of 4,000 troops and re-stared his estimate that a £20,000 surplus would be generated. See Ball to 
Camden 19th April 1805, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/10/134. 
78 Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/10/125 and CO 158/10/135 He asserted that the deficit would be 
liquidated by the end of next year, i.e. by the end of the financial year 1805-6.  His optimism was not 
vindicated as the failed mission incurred significant losses.  
79  Public Record Office, Kew CO 159/3/121-122 Camden to Ball 24th February 1804 and Ball to 
Camden 19th April, CO 158/10/ 1365 where he stated that by the close of “next year” the deficit would 
“nearly” be liquidated. 
80  Ball reported that  forty thousand salms were to be purchased which Ball calculated had saved the 
Island £80,000 compared with what might have been spent had Sicily remained the source of supply.  
Government would, he forecast, earn a  profit of £20,000 on the transaction: Ball to Camden 16th 
September 1804 CO 158/9/47-49. A salm is equivalent to eight and one eighth ‘Winchester bushels’. 
81  Public Record Office, Kew, Ball to Windham CO 158/13/9 et seq., 28th February 1807. This 
represents Ball’s defence to a number of accusations levelled  by his critics against his  “character and 
administration” including, his competence in the corn speculation and its aftermath.  
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The débacle was one for which the Jurats were blamed, largely because the large 
volume of grain that was shipped to Malta appeared too rapidly in harbour to be 
accommodated. The grain stores were inadequate to receive the consignments: 
some granaries were actually being used as barracks because a large contingent of 
troops under General Sir James Craig had arrived on the Island;82 other granaries 
were already full when the consignments arrived, and so of necessity, the wheat 
remained too long on board ships, as a result of which it decayed.  But that was not 
all because  the wheat Chapman purchased was soft rather than hard wheat which 
was more liable to decompose when shipped.  83 
 
The Jurats were forced to release the wheat onto the open market, and the 
oversupply of poor quality grain meant that the market prices it fetched were much 
less than anticipated. The administration’s reputation for competence suffered as a 
result of political  disquiet about the poor quality of bread made from the bad wheat. 
The evident failure   damaged its credibility and  added to the financial problems of 
the  Università (and thus of the Island), as Ball was forced to admit.84    
 
It is the aftermath of  Chapman’s corn mission  that is most revealing. Perhaps 
relying on reports from the Jurats,  Ball   claimed that the Chapman’s consignment 
had actually generated a surplus, but somewhat less than he had expected.85 
Livingstone, one of the Jurats, concluded in 1807: “..there has accrued to 
Government a considerable profit upon the whole transaction…” 86 This corroborated 
a report that  Ball  had earlier made to his superiors that the “saving to Government” 
was at least £21957, probably more.87  This was, of course, greater than  the sum 
predicted for a fully  successful mission.  The true picture was almost certainly very 
different. Thornton described the costly failure as “by far the greatest loss that [the 
Università] had then, or since, sustained.” 88  His investigation into the Università 
                                                 
82 Ball to Windham 28th February 1807, Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/13/ 59. 
83  Ibid., CO 158/13/9  esp. 80. 
84 Although Ball steadfastly maintained that, taken as a whole, the consignment produced a profit: 
Public Record Office, Kew,  CO 158/13/58-59; CO 158/13/80; CO 158/13/206. 
85 Ball to Shee 12th My 1807 CO 158/13/314, Public Record Office Kew, CO 158/13/ 315. 
86  Livingstone to Ball 25th February 1807,   Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/13/206. 
87   The careful emphasis  on the “saving to Government” is revealing because Ball was not explicitly 
stating that there was a surplus; he is simply inferring   that the Government would have had to spend 
more had they bought grain elsewhere.  Ball to Cooke, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/11/9 et seq.. 
Ball sent with this dispatch a statement of the costs and expenses of  the Black Sea corn mission, not a 
revenue statement. 
88 Thornton  above n.10 at p. 16. 
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revealed a loss  in excess of 805,000 scudi (£80, 500  approx.) for the financial year 
1805-1806.89   
 
The difference between the claims made by Ball and the facts identified by Thornton 
is stark. One possible explanation for this may lie in an attempt by the Jurats-whom 
Ball blamed and subsequently dismissed- to cover up the true extent of their failure in 
a vain attempt to keep their jobs.  But an alternative possibility that cannot be entirely 
discounted would suggest that Ball connived in a significant misreporting.  
 
(iii) Efficiency Savings 
 
Evidence of Ball’s sensitivity to taxation  in 1805 can be seen in Coleridge’s very first 
bando, (Proclamation) of 29th January 1805 which is of particular interest here 
because it reveals Ball’s  hesitation even in cases where taxation was both 
constitutionally familiar to the Maltese and economically necessary.  The bando in 
question concerns  the repair of roads and, in particular, the  regulation of cart 
wheels.  The purpose of the instrument was to safeguard the road surfaces. By 
avoiding damage in the first place, the Administration would  minimise the need for 
costly repairs.    
 
Other economies were also pursued, but with mixed results. In his Memorandum to 
Dundas of December 1800 Ball had noted that the expense of the hospitals  was one 
of the greatest burdens of the civil government. This admission was  followed by the 
bold assertion that this cost could be “halved” as there were many (unspecified) 
“abuses”.    Ball was subsequently able to  assure his superiors that he had reformed 
the hospitals in 1804, although he admitted that the costs had risen in that financial 
year, as a result of providing a salary incentive for management. He was also careful 
to emphasise  that costs had declined sharply in 1805 as the reforms took effect.90  
 
 However financial accountability was poor.  Having put the machinery of reform in 
place, it seems likely that Ball failed to follow up put in place a monitoring system. 
Neither, it seems, did Coleridge in his capacity as Public Secretary.   The Royal 
                                                 
89 A surplus of  approximately  26,000 scudi had  accrued to the Università in the financial year 1804-
1805: Thornton, Id. 
90 See Macaulay to Ball, 10th September 1804 CO 158/9/51, 55-6 Ball admitted that the salary of the 
three Presidents had been increased so as to ensure his leadership in providing good management, and 
drew attention to “considerable reforms” which seem to have involved the merger of the Invalids and 
Foundlings Hospital. 
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Commission of 1812 reported that the hospitals had become over-manned: twice as 
many staff had been employed as were needed to serve its needs and this appeared 
to be long standing problem. 
 
Although many of the important records have not survived,91 it is believed that the 
extant financial and other information furnishes some evidence that there were 
systemic problems about which Coleridge ought to have been aware and which, as 
Acting Public Secretary,  he might have been expected to address.    His uncritical 
acceptance of Ball’s policies is also of interest, particularly as his loyalty in this 
respect went beyond an appropriate expression of collective ministerial responsibility 
for government policy. A more scholarly objectivity in his subsequent accounts of the 
Island is lacking, in particular in those accounts in the Friend, which were first 
published after Ball’s death in 1809.92 
 
Conclusion 
 
When Coleridge was unexpectedly appointed to the pro tempore office of Public 
secretary he found himself burdened with a range of responsibilities including the 
oversight of the departments of government and semi-autonomous institutions that 
were critical to the success of the British administration.  In his notebooks he 
ventured numerous complaints about being over burdened by the extensive 
demands of his appointment. But his difficulties may have been more complex than 
merely being overloaded.  
 
In Coleridge’s defence it can be argued that his role required him to support and 
implement the polices of the Civil Commissioner many of which were flawed either in 
conception or implementation. Pre-eminent amongst these are the  financial policies 
intended to ensure that the revenue of the Island was sufficient to meet its 
expenditure and thus to avoid a burden on the British taxpayer. Coleridge was not 
responsible for the authorship of these polices, but there is evidence that, in so far as 
they were poorly executed, Coleridge does share a responsibility. For example, the 
hospitals were over-manned, the Jurats were to an unacceptable degree 
unsupervised, there were no proper controls on authorising expenditure and lines of 
                                                 
91 In  the 1870’s it seems that  a large part  of the papers of the Public Secretary’s office were 
deliberately destroyed to create   space at the Chief Secretary’s office for more recent records: 
Despatch  to Secretary of State 412 19th December 1936: see Caruana, above n 28. 
92 Above n.1, most notably pp. 527-580. 
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accountability were obfuscated. Most telling is Ball’s admission that the accounts 
were not properly inspected. This conflicts with Coleridge’s evidence that he was 
involved in auditing the Departments, but the impression that this function was not 
thoroughly and professionally discharged is impossible to dispel.  
 
A possible explanation, albeit one favourable to Coleridge, is that the  role of Public 
Secretary was simply too multi-faceted requiring specialist administrative and 
professional skills. Ball’s  assessment of the facts following the merger of the roles of 
Public Secretary and Treasurer seems to bear this out. It indicates that when so 
combined, the  duties could not properly be discharged by one office holder, and it is 
significant that he sought a professionally qualified individual to oversee the 
accounts. Moreover, the eclectic range of responsibilities of Public secretary is 
sufficient in itself to justify the conclusion that the Office was beyond the abilities of 
one individual.  Perhaps no   officeholder could have managed effectively  the tasks 
properly assigned to the Office, much less an untrained poet in uncertain health.  
 
A further benign possibility  that absolves Coleridge of some of the blame for the 
structural failings of the administration,  is one that requires further research.  It 
suggests that Coleridge, as a  temporary stand-in was “by-passed” by Maltese 
administrators; in other words that some at least of the functions of the office were 
assumed by others, most notably the Proseggretario, Guiseppe Zammit.  It is unclear 
whether Coleridge was aware of this, or agreed to it.  What is apparent is that 
Coleridge, unlike other Public Secretaries, did not direct the affairs of the government 
departments by issuing “ordine”, for there are none recorded in his name.  To that 
extent scholars need to re-assess earlier assumptions that Coleridge performed the 
tasks of a professional administrator appointed to the office of Public Secretary: there 
is clear evidence that he did not perform the role to the same extent as officeholders.  
This not only  illuminates  his achievement in office  in 1805, but also raises further 
questions about the effectiveness of the under-skilled British administration under Sir 
Alexander Ball. 
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